The Best Nix for a Combined Honeypot Sensor Server by Rodriguez, Stephen M.
Regis University
ePublications at Regis University
All Regis University Theses
Spring 2011
The Best Nix for a Combined Honeypot Sensor
Server
Stephen M. Rodriguez
Regis University
Follow this and additional works at: https://epublications.regis.edu/theses
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons
This Thesis - Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by ePublications at Regis University. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Regis
University Theses by an authorized administrator of ePublications at Regis University. For more information, please contact epublications@regis.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rodriguez, Stephen M., "The Best Nix for a Combined Honeypot Sensor Server" (2011). All Regis University Theses. 632.
https://epublications.regis.edu/theses/632
 
 
Regis University  
College for Professional Studies Graduate Programs  
Final Project/Thesis  
 
 
Disclaimer
 
 
 
Use of the materials available in the Regis University Thesis Collection 
(“Collection”) is limited and restricted to those users who agree to comply with 
the following terms of use. Regis University reserves the right to deny access to 
the Collection to any person who violates these terms of use or who seeks to or 
does alter, avoid or supersede the functional conditions, restrictions and 
limitations of the Collection.  
 
The site may be used only for lawful purposes. The user is solely responsible for 
knowing and adhering to any and all applicable laws, rules, and regulations 
relating or pertaining to use of the Collection.  
 
All content in this Collection is owned by and subject to the exclusive control of 
Regis University and the authors of the materials. It is available only for research 
purposes and may not be used in violation of copyright laws or for unlawful 
purposes. The materials may not be downloaded in whole or in part without 
permission of the copyright holder or as otherwise authorized in the “fair use” 
standards of the U.S. copyright laws and regulations.  
 
 
 
THE BEST NIX FOR A COMBINED HONEYPOT SENSOR SERVER 
 
A PROJECT 
SUBMITTED ON 13 OF APRIL, 2011 
TO THE DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY OF THE SCHOOL OF 
COMPUTER & INFORMATION SCIENCES 
OF REGIS UNIVERSITY 
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF MASTER OF SCIENCE IN 
COMPUTER INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES 
BY 
Stephen M. Rodrugez 
 
 
 
APPROVALS 
      
Advisor Name, [Thesis/Project] Advisor 
      
Douglas I. Hart 
 
      
Shari Plantz-Masters 
 
 
 
Project Paper Revision/Change History 
 
Date Project Status or Change 
04/22/ 2008 Initial Project Meeting with ILB Project Lead (Jeff Brown) 
04/25/ 2008 Decided on Solaris 10 for Honeypot sensor server on a Sun E-450 
04/29/ 2008 Began hardware/ OS software configuration on Sun E-450 
05/21/ 2008 Completed hardware, OS software, and network configuration of Sun E-450 
06/04/ 2008 Submitted formal Idea document with the initial Annotated Bibliography 
06/17/ 2008 Began installation of Honeypot sensor server software 
07/12/ 2008 Submitted formal Project Statement of Work (SOW) 
08/21/ 2008 Worked with sancp developer on compiling issue with Solaris 10 
09/17/ 2008 Determined pads component would not compile on Solaris 10 
10/23/ 2008 Determined needed tcl and tclx versions were not compatible on Solaris 10 
Abandoned Sun Solaris 10 as workable solution for Honeypot sensor server 
11/04/ 2008 Began installing Honeypot sensor software on HP running Red Hat Linux 
11/21/ 2008 Submitted Thesis and Chapter 1 for Review 
11/28/ 2008 Completed Honeypot sensor software install 
12/03/ 2008 Revised Thesis statement based on shift in project scope 
12/11/ 2008 Sucessfully tested Honeypot sensor server via remote Honeypot client software 
1/15/ 2009 Began data collection/ compilation 
6/5/2009 Began drafting paper 
12/29/2009 Completed final draft 
1/7/ 2010 Completed final edits 
11/1/2010 Administrative Review and Return for edits 
3/14/2011 Final Draft Submitted 
4/13/2011 Format Corrections 
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
The Best NIX for a Combined Honeypot Sensor Server      6 
 
 
Abstract 
The paper will examine (through case-study) the usability of open source operating systems 
software for a combined Honeypot sensor server.  The study will scrutinize the use of two Unix 
variants, Linux Red Hat and the Sun Solaris operating systems as candidates for deployment of a 
combined Honeypot sensor server.  Appropriate unbiased metrics, such as extensibility, 
reliability, ease of install and use, will be employed as a likely criterion to evaluate the operating 
systems for the role of hosting Honeypot sensor server software. 
7 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
It has been a privilege to attend an institution based in the Christian ethos of service to 
the community and the Lord.  On many occasions at Regis University, I have seen the Spirit in 
action.  I have seen instructors, students, and faculty give generously of their time, knowledge, 
and their kindness towards a stranger’s success.  As that stranger, I am grateful and honored to 
have partook of this blessing.  In particular, I would like to thank Daniel Likarish, Jeffrey A. 
Brown, Todd Edmands, and Annette Argo without whose contributions, this project would have 
been a success. 
I thank my family for their support over these many years of study.   As a family, may we 
enjoy the benefits of this shared success.  The goal has always been the freedom and opportunity 
that knowledge bestows.  In closing, may we know God’s love, light, and eternal peace… 
8 
 
Table of Contents 
Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... 6 
Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................................... 7 
List of Figures ................................................................................................................................ 9 
List of Tables ............................................................................................................................... 10 
Chapter One: Introduction and Project Background Summary ........................................... 11 
Problem Statement...................................................................................................................... 12 
Qualitative Case Study ............................................................................................................... 14 
Relevance of Project ................................................................................................................... 15 
Project Barriers ........................................................................................................................... 16 
Proposal and Scope ..................................................................................................................... 16 
Risks ............................................................................................................................................. 16 
Document Organization ............................................................................................................. 17 
Definition of Acronyms............................................................................................................... 18 
Chapter Two: Research .............................................................................................................. 20 
Honeypot Overview .................................................................................................................... 20 
Honeypot Components ............................................................................................................... 22 
Heart of the Honeypot: The Sensor ........................................................................................... 22 
The Choice of the Honeypot Sensor Server OS........................................................................ 24 
Criteria for OS Analysis ............................................................................................................. 25 
Chapter Three: Configuration................................................................................................... 28 
Hardware Configuration ............................................................................................................ 28 
Software Configuration .............................................................................................................. 36 
Chapter Four: Wrapping it Up ................................................................................................. 40 
Results .......................................................................................................................................... 40 
Summary ...................................................................................................................................... 45 
Recommendations ....................................................................................................................... 45 
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................ 47 
  
9 
 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 1: Logical network diagram of an… (Rodriguez, 2008)……………………………...12 
Figure 2:  Honeypot Data Lifecycle (Rodriguez, 2009)……………………………………… 21 
Figure 3: Example Honeypot sensor network configurations (Rodriguez, 2008)………….. 23 
Figure 4: OS Version Information (Rodriguez, 2008)……………………………………….. 24 
Figure 5: Combined Honeypot Sensor Server OS Criterion (Rodriguez, 2009)…………… 25 
Figure 6: Disk Layout and Partitions (Rodriguez, 2009)……………………………………. 36 
 
10 
 
List of Tables 
 
Table 1: Simplified OS Decision Matrix (Rodriguez, 2008)…………………………… 13 
Table 2: Sun Enterprise[tm] 450 Server Hardware Spec…(Rodriguez, 2009)………. 33 
Table 3: HP ProLiant DL380 G5 Server series…(HP, 2009)…………...……………… 36 
Table 4: Sguil Software Components (Bianco, 2008)…………………………………... 39 
Table 5: Extensive OS Decision Matrix (Rodriguez, 2009)……………………………. 40 
11 
 
Chapter One: Introduction and Project Background Summary 
 
This project encompassed the development, configuration, test, and verification of an 
Internet-facing Honeypot sensor server that can be used within a future Regis University 
Information Assurance (IA) lab or within the curriculum.  Although, this project began with a 
grander scheme of examining the veracity of a completely functional Internet Facing Honeypot 
Network, the project shifted to determining the best operating system to host a combined 
Honeypot sensor server software suite, based on the technical difficulties encountered using an 
established Unix vendor as the “first-choice” operating system.   
The development of the Internet-facing combined Honeypot sensor sever would reinforce 
concepts, methods, and techniques taught at different levels of IA coursework through education, 
awareness, and hands-on training.  The Honeypot sensor server is only part of a larger Honeypot 
system, so the expectation is that this initiation project will be followed by future Regis SEAD 
students that will continue to build out the remaining Honeypot system.  The choice of the 
operating system for the sensor sever is critical for the Honeypot system success; this paper will 
attempt to demonstrate the pros and cons of two flavors of popular server operating systems.   
Figure 1 is a logical network diagram of an Internet-facing Honeypot system (Rodriguez, 2008).   
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Figure 1: Logical network diagram of an Internet-facing Honeypot system (Rodriguez, 
2008) 
Problem Statement 
 
The study will document and provide metrics to determine the usability of open source 
operating systems software for a combined Honeypot sensor server.  It is purposed that the study 
will examine the use of two Unix variants, Red Hat Linux and the Sun Solaris operating systems 
as candidates for deployment of a combined Honeypot sensor server.  Suitable unbiased metrics, 
such as extensibility, reliability, ease of install and use, will be examined as a likely criterion to 
evaluate the operating systems as a viable Honeypot sensor server candidate. 
Potential Solutions  
 
Due to the importance of the Honeypot sensor server to the Honeypot network, the choice 
of a suitable operating system is paramount to the success of the system.  The Honeypot software 
chosen for this exercise, purported to support a myriad of Unix and Linux variant (Visscher, 
2007).   At the time of the project’s commencement, the choice of suitable hardware was limited, 
which tended to limit the OS selection for the sensor server. 
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Sun Solaris and a variety of Linux distributions were considered as the OS of choice, for 
the combined Honeypot sensor sever (Brown, 2008).   The OS determination was made, based 
on the hardware available, the reputation of a proven operating system, individual familiarity, 
and the access to a variety of support mechanisms (see Table 1).      
Operating 
System (OS) 
Hardware 
Support 
Database 
Support 
Software Support Individual 
Experience 
Solaris YES (NATIVE) YES (NATIVE) YES YES 
Red Hat NO YES YES YES  
Ubuntu YES YES YES NO 
Gentoo NO UNKNOWN UNKNOWN NO 
Table 1: Simplified OS Decision Matrix (Rodriguez, 2008) 
Initally, Sun was selected, based hardware support, familiarity, native database support, 
and other qualifying criteria (see Figure 2. Simplified Decision Matix).   Sun is a stalwart in the 
Unix industry having contributed heavily to the Unix computing environment, with solutions 
such as NFS, NIS, Java, etc.(Sun Microsystems, Inc., 2008).   Since Regis had recently received 
a donation of Sun equipment and its operating system was being offered as a free download, it 
seemed a reasonable candidate to host the combined Honeypot sensor server software.    Though 
Sun Solaris was initially decided on as the OS of choice for the Honeypot sensor server, it was 
abandoned after months of failed attempts to compile all the needed software components for the 
system.   
Red Hat is one of the premier providers for enterprise class Linux distributions.  Since its 
first release in 1994, Red Hat has continued to grow and win numerous awards (Red Hat, 2008).  
Ultimately, Red Hat Linux was used and successfully supported this project.   
14 
 
Qualitative Case Study  
 This project will present a qualitative case study of the configuration of a Honeypot 
sensor server, employing a research methodology that utilizes an evidence-based analysis.  The 
research methodology chapter, demonstrates the types of evidence observed and measurables 
identified. The study will attempt to remove the subjective (e.g., individual experience with a 
product) and place value on empirical research, though it is acknowledged that a totally objective 
analysis is not feasible when considering factors such as ease of install, use, supportability, etc. 
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Relevance of Project 
 
The criticality of information assurance (IA) in an organization continues to gain greater 
importance in the enterprise.  With this, comes the ever-increasing challenge for educational 
institutions to output quality graduates able to meet the task.  New threats and risks to an 
enterprise’s IA posture are continually being developed and exploited.  One educational solution 
to this ongoing threat to enterprise information assurance is to provide students with a real-world 
environment, where threats are constantly evaluated and risk mitigation actively explored. As has 
been empirically demonstrated, a student’s learning is enhanced through hands-on experience, 
experimentation, and in-depth labs (Fisher, 2004). The intent of this project is to deliver an 
operational Internet-facing, combined Honeypot sensor server that will provide a learning 
environment where students can exercise new and existing IA skills.  The student will 
accomplish this, by analyzing current threats and develop techniques to minimize risks to the 
organization.  
 The selection, configuration, and delivery of the Honeypot sensor server is the 
foundation for this project’s current and ongoing relevance, key to this success is the choice of 
operating system for the sensor.  An operating system/ network operating system (OS/ NOS) is 
the basis for the security triad of confidentiality, integrity, and availability (Dulaney, 2009).  In 
the absence of a secure OS, the Honeypot’s worth would be diminished, if not completely 
negated.  Besides affording an interface to the hardware and a command execution environment, 
today’s secure network operating systems also provide authentication,  accounting, and 
availability (Bovet & Cesati, 2006): 
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Project Barriers 
As with any low-funded and understaffed educational endeavor, there are many barriers 
that accompany such a project.  The first challenge was acquiring suitable software and hardware 
to support the project.  Because of budgetary constraints, open source and freely available 
software was utilized.  The hardware requirements are dictated by software and yet, still need to 
be robust enough to handle the traffic that will traverse a fully operational, Internet-facing 
Honeypot sensor server.  Thus, the hardware available at the time of project commencement, had 
a direct correlation on the software selected.  
Proposal and Scope 
There are four phases of the project work in this case study: 
Phase I:  Hardware selection, installation, configuration, and verification. 
Phase II:  Operating System selection, installation, configuration, and verification. 
Phase III:  Honeypot sensor server software selection, installation, configuration, and 
verification. 
Phase IV:  Final Honeypot sensor server verification and testing.  
Risks 
 In the end, this project strives to increase security within the organization/ enterprise.  As 
Lance Spitzner states, “security is all about reducing risk” ( Honeypots : tracking hackers, 2003, 
p. 321).  This project presents some technical risks to Regis University by placing the Honeypot 
system within the organization’s infrastructure and exposing it to the Internet.  Spitzner identifies 
three risk factors with Honeypot systems ( Honeypots : tracking hackers, 2003): 
1. Level of Interaction: hackers are given full access to the system and can possibly 
compromise system beyond configuration restraints. 
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2. Complexity:  the Honeypot system is comprised of many complex elements (firewalls, 
rulesets, access control lists, etc.) and requires competent system/ network administration 
controls. 
3. Network exposure:  the Honeypot system is Internet accessible and can provide a means 
for hackers to access an organization’s internal network. 
Document Organization  
The remainder of document will address the following topics: 
 Research: data and information collection/ dissemination concerning this project. 
 Configuration: setup and configuration of the hardware and software in support of this 
project. 
 Results/ Recommendations: finding and final determinations of this project. 
 Summary: project synopsis and review.  
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Terms 
Definition of Acronyms 
 
Acronym  
CERT Not an acronym. CERT term is owned by Carnegie Mellon University, 
and is part of the Software Engineering Institute 
CPU Central Processing Unit 
DoD Department of Defense 
GUI Graphical User Interface 
HPC  High Performance Computing 
IA Information Assurance 
IDS Intrusion Detection System 
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers 
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force 
IPS Intrusion Prevention System 
LAN Local Area Network 
MAC Media Access Control 
NIC Network Interface Card 
NIDS Network Intrusion Detection System 
NOS Network Operating System 
OS Operating System/s 
RAID Redundant Array Of Independent Disks 
ROI Return On Investment 
RPM Red Hat Package Manager 
SANS SysAdmin, Audit, Network, Security Institute 
SCSI Small Computer System Interface 
SQL Structured Query Language 
TCO Total Cost of Ownership 
US-CERT United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team  
WAN Wide Area Network 
WWW World Wide Web 
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Definition of Terms 
 
Term  Definition 
Authentication Authentication requires users to prove their identity 
Extensibility  
Framework Frameworks provide structure and guidelines 
Information 
Assurance 
Measures that protect and defend information systems by ensuring their 
availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation.  
These measures include providing for restoration of information systems by 
incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities. (National 
Information Assurance Glossary) 
Information 
Security (IS) 
Protecting information and information systems from unauthorized access, 
use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction. Information security 
is concerned with confidentiality, integrity, and availability. (CITE) 
Measurement  In this study, the data collections are both internal and external to the 
environment 
Model Models are conceptual, and do not provide any direction or guidelines 
  
  
Protocol A protocol is an agreed upon format for transmitting data between two 
devices 
Reliability A data collection strategy in qualitative study that requires stability and the 
creation of creatable procedures which is accomplished with a formal case 
study 
Security  Security is described through the accomplishment of some basic security 
properties, namely confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information. 
(Kotzanikolaou and Douligeris) 
Security 
Architecture 
The design artifacts that describe how the security controls are positioned and 
how they relate to the overall IT architecture. These controls serve the 
purpose to maintain the system’s quality attributes, among them 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability. (CITE, 2008) 
Standards Written definition or rule approved for compliance by consensus or by 
authoritative groups 
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Chapter Two: Research 
Honeypot Overview 
 
 Much can be found in print and online, detailing research and proving the concepts of 
Honyepot systems.  "A honeypot is an information system resource whose value lies in 
unauthorized or illicit use of that resource" (Spitzner, 2003).   In essence, a Honeypot network is 
an intentionally designed, security-flawed network, composed of a variety of vulnerable sub-
systems and computers.  Its objective is to delay, divert, and draw attackers to a central point by 
the use of subterfuge.  It can be used to as a means of legal entrapment against would-be hackers 
(Dulaney, 2009).  Oftentimes, the Honeypot contains false data (e.g., spreadsheets, employee 
lists, accounting information, etc.) that is left within the vulnerable system.   
At this point, it makes sense to define the difference between the terms Honeynet and 
Honeypot.    A Honeynet is a high-interaction implementation of a Honeypot  (Spitzner, 2002).   
However referenced, both are considered a NIDS (Network Intrusion Detection System) and 
play a role as part of the network security paradigm.   
A Honeypot can directly support the SecSDLC (The Security Systems Development Life 
Cycle) and as a result, an organization’s security policy.  Furthermore, a Honeypot accomplishes 
this by supplying a means for investigation, analysis, design, implementation, maintenance, and 
change (Whitman & Mattord, 2005).  Similarly, figure 4 depicts the Honeypot data lifecycle, 
from the threats entry into the Honeypot, to the final desired effect (knowledge). 
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Figure 2:  Honeypot Data Lifecycle (Rodriguez, 2009) 
Honeypot Advantages  
The Honypot’s ultimate benefit is that of knowledge and experience.  Unless the 
organization is building products off the information gathered, it generally does not provide any 
production value to an organization.  Honeypots, when effectively utilized (Whitman & Mattord, 
2005): 
 Can obtain useful information on the methods of attackers, hackers, and intruders.   
 Can be used to identify network risks and vulnerabilities.   
 Can be used to identify current methods and techniques employed by hackers. 
 Can be used to aid in incident response, forensics, and legal prosecution of computer/ 
network espionage. 
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Honeypot Disadvantages 
Honeypots do have their limitations.  First, Honeypots are not reliable countermeasures 
for enterprise security, meaning, they are not an IPS (Intrusion Prevention System).  In addition, 
they can have the effect of taunting attackers and result in an increase in the severity of attacks 
on the enterprise.  Lastly, they expose a part of the organization’s network to intruders and may 
compromise an organization’s security strategy, or provide inadvertent information on a further 
means of attack.   For example, if the sensor or other network device is compromised, it may 
provide a backdoor to an organization’s intranet (Whitman & Mattord, 2005). 
Honeypot Components 
 As can be derived from Figure 3, the Honeypot is composed of distinct components or 
modules.  The system can be simplified into three sections, the Honeypot sensor,  the server, and 
the client (Visscher, 2007).   The the sensor monitors and collects network packets.  In addition, 
the sensor identifies data based on rules, also known as signature-based monitoring (Dulaney, 
2009).  The server has the ability to log, store (archive), or discard the data.  The server contains 
the database component of the Honeypot system and facilitates the auditing capability of the 
product.  Lastly, the client provides a means for the human element, where the Honeypot user/ 
administrator can turn raw data into actionable information and ultimately gain knowledge. 
Heart of the Honeypot: The Sensor 
As previously conveyed, the focus of this writing is towards the configuration of the 
sensor server (consolidation of first two sections of the Honeypot system).  The sensor is the 
heart of the Honeypot network.  Its job is to capture and monitor packets traversing the Honeypot 
network.  The Honeypot sensor can be setup in various network configurations: directly in-band 
to the traffic path (as a type of pass-through router), out-of-band on a network switch (port 
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monitoring), or as another node on the Honeypot network (packet sniffer).  See figure 4 for the 
respective configuration examples.   
 
Figure 3: Example Honeypot sensor network configurations (Rodriguez, 2008) 
Due to its mission, the sensor (or combination sensor server) should be robust 
enough to support this type of role.  The sensor software dictates the minimum 
hardware requirements, as does most software.  Many of today’s server class 
computers, can be adequately configured for this purpose. Common to most Honeypot 
servers, is the need for (Hoepers & Steding-Jessen, 2006): 
 A highly robust multi-tasking, multi-processor server. 
 RAID disk arrays to store the large amounts of data collected, availability, and provide 
for the necessary through-put of high traffic scenarios. 
 Depending on configuration, at least one high-speed network interface (see Figure 4).  
 Suitable hardware to support the requirement for a database server. 
There are many suitable Honeypot software suites/ packages.  Many are freely available and 
based on open source software license agreements.  They can be compiled to run on a variety of 
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hardware platforms and operating systems.  A sampling of Honeypot software, can be found at 
The Honeynet Project: http://project.honeynet.org/project. 
The Choice of the Honeypot Sensor Server OS 
The focus of this paper’s research is centered on the choice of OS, for a combined 
Honeypot sensor server.  The selection of the OS is driven by the need to combine analogous and 
disparate software modules that can be compiled, to become the Honeypot system.  The OS 
needs to support an open environment, in the sense that from developers to end-users, the OS 
should not impede the success of the project.    
Two established operating systems were considered for the implementation of the 
combined Honeypot Sensor Server:  Sun Solaris 10 and Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4.1.2.  Both 
operating systems are leaders in their industry and good Unix and Linux representatives.  Both 
are innovative and have contributed to the continuing strength and success of the Unix and Linux 
operating systems.   The intent of this study is not to determine what OS is necessarily better, but 
to identify the OS that was better suited for this specific project.  The parameters of this study 
were limited to one particular Honeypot software suite and which OS was more readily suited to 
support the success of this project.  See figure 5 for the command outputs that display OS version 
information (for Red Hat Linux and Sun’s OS, respectively). 
[srodri506@centaur ~]$ uname  -a 
Linux centaur.vlab.us 2.6.18-92.1.22.el5 #1 SMP Tue Dec 16 12:03:43 EST 2008 i686 i686 i386 
GNU/Linux 
[srodri506@centaur ~]$ cat  /proc/version 
Linux version 2.6.18-92.1.22.el5 (mockbuild@builder16.centos.org) (gcc version 4.1.2 
20071124 (Red Hat 4.1.2-42)) #1 SMP Tue Dec 16 12:03:43 EST 2008 
root:sensor# uname –a 
SunOS sensor 5.10 Generic_137111-08 sun4u sparc SUNW,Ultra-4 
Figure 4: OS Version Information (Rodriguez, 2008) 
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Criteria for OS Analysis 
As the study proceeds in the following chapters, a set of OS characteristics will be 
presented that were found to be pertinent to the development and configuration of the combined 
Honeypot sensor server.  Figure 6, is a pictorial representation of the OS characteristics that were 
found valuable in the successful deployment in the Honeypot project.  The elements of the 
pyramid (Figure 6) are categorized into: ease of install, extensibility, reliability,  and 
performance. 
 
Figure 5: Combined Honeypot Sensor Server OS Criterion (Rodriguez, 2009) 
26 
 
Ease of install is a relative determination of the ease in which the OS was installed, based on 
a familiarity with current and past OS installations over a 20 year period.  Both Solaris 10 and 
Red Hat 4 possessed equally intuitive install GUIs that made installation of the OS 
straightforward and problem-free.  Ease of install is important to the Honeypot, due to the fact 
that Honeypot systems are meant to be attacked, compromised, and rebuilt. 
Extensibility is the degree in which a system can be modified to adopt to future requirements, 
while maximizing an organization’s ROI (Cornish, et. al., 2003). Since 2000, Red Hat has not 
officially supported Sun’s Sparc CPU, which equates to a decrease in platform support 
(Shankland, 2000).   Sun’s has continued to ink important hardware partnerships, IBM longtime 
cooperation with Sun being one of many examples (Vaughan-Nichols, 2007).  With Oracle’s 
acquisition of Sun, Solaris is poised to expand its market share.  Sun ultimately has the 
advantage in this area, by supporting more types of architectures and platforms (Babcock, 2008).  
Extensibility is important to the longevity and resilience of the Honeypot project. 
Reliability is  a measure of  the product’s dependability, to ensure system uptime.  Both 
Solaris 10 and Red Hat are mature operating systems with successful track records of enterprise 
support.  Reliability supports the Honeypot ‘s availability.  The Honeypot’s effectiveness is 
directly related to its uptime. 
Performance is the efficiency, resource effectiveness, and comparative speed of the operating 
system to its competitiors.  There is very little definitive research giving one operating system an 
overall performance advantage over the other.  For example, looking at Sun’s own research 
comparing their latest ZFS file system to other common Linux file systems, results in the all-too-
common, “depending on the application” commentary (Sun, 2007).  Also, many of the 
comparisons seemed to be testing systems that were just too different in hardware configurations, 
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thus nullifying the results (Principled Technologies, 2007).    Performance is important to the 
Honeypot system, because of the resources (CPU, memory, and I/O)  required to handle the load 
of a network-based attack.  For example, a DOS (denial of service) attack is based on 
bombarding a network ed computing device with data packes, to the point the system becomes 
unusable. 
OS Support is the ability and the cost related to software maintenance.  Though Sun argues 
that their overall TCO is less than Red Hat, it is undeniable that an open OS affords more 
avenues to support than the traditional software model. The findings of this project were that Red 
Hat was more prevalent and maintainable.  With the advent of OpenSolaris, this result may 
change in the future with Sun’s participation of the open source movement.   Open source 
software benefits from a community of free developers and testers.  Redhat has better leveraged 
this model through the use of its beta OS’.  The supportablity of the OS is directly related to the 
longevity of the project. 
Sustainment is the ongoing ability to support a project in a cost-effective manner. Where 
supportablity addresses the technical issues of maintaining the project, sustainability tackles the 
logistics of what it would take to maintain the project from a personnel/ resource point of view.   
For example, Solaris system administrators wear very specialized suits, as Sun continues to bring 
their own brand of uniqueness and innovation to the table (e.g., RBAC, Zones, Dtrace, etc.).  Red 
Hat’s innovations (e.g., RPM) have been quickly adopted by the Linux community, thus 
avoiding the “members only” mentality or the requirement for specialized training. 
The database houses all the data, needed for the operation of the Honeypot.  The data is 
mined, analyzed, and signatures  built on traffic patterns, so database support is a principal 
consideration.  Database support is the ability to maintain and support the required database for 
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the Honeypot system.  Sun is owned by Oracle, a leading database provider.  And, with Sun’s 
acquisition of  MySQL in  2008, Sun now has the ability to bundle MySQL with their OS as a 
low-cost alternative to Orac le suite of database products (MySQL.com, 20008). 
Security is the ability for the system/ OS to provide confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
(Dulaney, 2009).  Being able to secure the Honeypot server is critical for this project to provide a 
viable environment for study, testing, and learning.  Back in 1995, Sun released its first version 
of what it termed “Trusted OS” (Brunette, 2006).  Sun has continued to improve the security 
within the Solaris platform with a myriad of tools and concepts on access, auditing, accounting, 
allocation controls. (Sun, 2009).  For example, through zoning, Sun allows easily built and 
secured virtual environments.  Again, Linux is not far behind, but Sun has a slight lead in this 
area (Babcock, 2008). 
Software Compatibility is the OS’ ability to support the required Honeypot software.  The 
majority of the Honeypot software packages were easily configured with Red Hat; whereas, 
trying to compile the needed packages and versions on Sun was difficult, and some cases not 
possible at the time of this study (April 2008- October 2008).   Examples of install and 
configuration can be found in the appendices.  
The result of this study (based on the selected Honeypot software) was conclusive.  Red 
Hat provided a more suitable OS for this project.  As figure 6 demonstrates, both operating 
systems have their advantages, but on the more critical issues of software compatibility, 
software/ OS support, and ongoing sustainability, Red Hat is clearly the OS of choice.  Lastly, 
Sun has only a slight advantage over Red Hat in the areas of security and database support. 
Chapter Three: Configuration 
Hardware Configuration 
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Since the project focused on the configuration of an Internet-facing combined Honeypot 
sensor sever, the type of hardware chosen would have to fulfill an important role.  The hardware 
would require significant disk space to host the possibly massive log collection and database 
growth.  The system would need sufficient resources to handle the data bursts that could 
accompany a malicious network attack.   Of course the system would need multi-processing/ 
multi-tasking capability to address all the software requirements. 
Sun Enterprise[tm] 450 Server 
The Sun Enterprise[tm] 450 Server debuted in September of 1997.  Although outdated by 
today’ standards, the server met the minimum requirements and was a good candidate to handle 
the load.  The sever also had adequate storage capabilities and potential for expansion (via built-
in SCSI adapters).  More importantly the hardware was readily available for this project.    
 
Processor 
Number From one to four processor modules 
Architecture 250-, 300-, 400- or 480-MHz UltraSPARC[tm]-II modules with onboard E-cache 
Cache memory 
16-KB I-cache, 16-KB D-cache per processor  
1-MB external cache per processor with 250-MHz CPU  
2-MB external cache per processor with 300-MHz CPU  
4-MB external cache per processor with 400-MHz CPU  
Datapath 
Two independent, buffered 144-bit UPA buses; 128 bits data, 16 bits ECC; 
two processors per bus  
UPA operates at 100-MHz with 300-MHz or 400-MHz processors  
Main Memory  
Capacities 16 DIMM module slots; four banks of four slots  
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Accepts 32-, 64-, 128-MB or 256-MB DIMMs  
128 MB to 4 GB total memory capacity  
Memory type 144-pin 5V 60-ns memory modules 
Datapath 
576 bits wide; 512 bits data, 64 bits ECC  
Up to 1.78-GB/sec throughput  
Standard Interfaces  
Ethernet 
One ethernet/fast ethernet (10BASE-T/100BASE-T) twisted-pair standard 
connector (RJ-45) or one MII for external transceiver connection, autoselect 
port 
Keyboard and 
mouse One standard keyboard/mouse port (mini DIN-8) 
Parallel One Centronics compatible, bidirectional, EPP port (DB25) 
PCI 
Ten slots compliant with PCI specification version 2.1: 
 Three slot operating at 33- or 66-MHz, 32- or 64-bit data bus width, 
3.3 volt  
 Four slots operating at 33-MHz, 32- or 64-bit data bus width, 5 volt  
 Three slots operating at 33-MHz, 32-bit data bus width, 3.3 volt 
SCSI One 20MB/sec, 68-pin, Fast/Wide SCSI-2 One, three, or five 40-MB/sec, UltraSCSI-3 buses for internal disks 
Serial Two RS-232D/RS423 serial ports (DB25 , requires a Y-type splitter cable) 
Internal Mass Storage 
Disks 
Up to twenty 4.2-GB, 9.1-GB, 18.2-GB, or 36.4-GB (3.5- x 1-in.) hot-swap 
UltraSCSI-3 drives 
 
Disk bays: Four, twelve, or twenty hot-swap disk bays 
Disk controllers: One, three, or five 40-MB/sec UltraSCSI-3 channels; 
maximum four drives per channel 
CD-ROM SunCD[tm] 12x or 32x 644-MB SCSI CD-ROM (standard) 
Floppy 1.44-MB 3.5-in. floppy drive (standard) 
Tape One bay available for optional 5.25- x 1.6-in. SCSI tape drive; 8-mm or 4-mm DDS-3, or SLR 
31 
 
Power Supplies  
Type One, two, or three modular, N+1 redundant, hot swap, universal input (two supplies standard) 
Output 1210W maximum, 605W maximum each supply 1120W maximum, 560W maximum each supply (before October 1997) 
Power bus Common, load-sharing 
Environment 
AC Input 100 - 240 VAC, 47 - 63 Hz, 13.8 A(max) 
Input Power 1664 W 
Heat Output 5680 BTU/hr 
Temperature1 Operating: 5° C to 35° C (41° F to 95° F) Nonoperating: -20° C to 60° C (-4° F to 140° F)  
Humidity Operating: 20% to 80% relative humidity, noncondensing Nonoperating: 5% to 93% relative humidity, noncondensing 
Altitude Operating: 3000 m (10,000 ft.) Nonoperating: 12,000 m (40,000 ft.)  
Acoustic noise Operating: 6.9 bels Idling: 6.3 bels 
Vibration Operating: 0.2G peak, 5 - 500 Hz, 3 perpendicular axes Nonoperating: 1G peak, 5 - 500 Hz, 3 perpendicular axes  
Shock Operating: 4G peak, 11 milliseconds half-sine pulse Nonoperating: 30G peak, 11 milliseconds half-sine pulse  
Number of cords 1 
1 The front and rear doors of the cabinet must be 63% open for adequate airflow. 
Regulations 
Meets or exceeds the following requirements:
Safety UL 1950 and CB-scheme EN60950 with Nordic Deviations, CUL C22.2 No. 950, TUV EN60950 
RFI/EMI FCC Class B, Industry Canada Class B, EN55022/CISPR22 Class B, VCCI Class B 
Immunity EN50082-1/IEC1000-4-2, IEC1000-4-3, IEC1000-4-4, IEC1000-4-5 
Harmonics EN61000-3-2/IEC1000-3-2 
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X-ray DHHS 21 Subchapter J, PTB German X-ray Decree 
Dimensions and Weights 
Height 58.1 cm (22.87 in.) 
Width 44.8 cm (17.64 in.) 
Depth 69.6 cm (27.40 in.) 
Weight 94.0 kg (205 lb.) 
Power Cord 2.5 m (8.2 ft.) 
Clearance and Service Access 
Front1 36 in. (91.44 cm.) 
Rear1 36 in. (91.44 cm.) 
Right1 36 in. (91.44 cm.) 
Left1 36 in. (91.44 cm.) 
Top1 36 in. (91.44 cm.) 
Airflow 
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1 These specifications refer to a sytem that is fully extended from the rack for service. When in 
normal operation, there are no side clearance requirements for the server as the air flow is from 
the front to rear. However, make sure that any front or back cabinet doors are 63% open to allow 
adequate airflow. This can be accomplished by removing the doors, or ensuring that the doors 
have a perforated pattern that provides a 63% open area.  
Rack Mounting  
The Sun Enterprise 450 can be mounted in a standard 19-in. rack. The optional rackmounting kit 
consists of a depth-adjustable, slide-mounted shelf and retaining bracket.  
Table 2: Sun Enterprise[tm] 450 Server Hardware Specifications (Rodriguez, 2009) 
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HP ProLiant DL380 G5 Server 
Following a number of unsuccessful attempts to install the Honeypot software on the Sun 
system (not hardware related), an HP ProLiant DL380 G5 Server was used.  One of the major 
advantages of the HP ProLiant line of servers is the embedded hardware RAID controller, which 
minimized configuration requirements.  In comparison, the Sun Enterprise[tm] 450 Server 
required the configuration of a slower software-based RAID controller. 
Processor & Memory 
Processor Type Intel® Xeon® 5400 series 
Intel® Xeon® 5300 series 
Intel® Xeon® 5200 series 
Processor Quad-Core Processors 
Intel® Xeon® processor X5470 (3.33 GHz, 1333MHz, 
120W) 
Intel® Xeon® processor X5460 (3.16 GHz, 1333MHz, 
120W) 
Intel® Xeon® processor X5450 (3.00 GHz, 1333MHz, 
120W) 
Intel® Xeon® processor E5450 (3.00 GHz, 1333MHz, 80W) 
Intel® Xeon® processor E5440 (2.83 GHz, 1333MHz, 80W) 
Intel® Xeon® processor E5430 (2.66 GHz, 1333MHz, 80W) 
Intel® Xeon® processor L5430 (2.66 GHz, 1333MHz, 50W) 
Intel® Xeon® processor E5420 (2.50 GHz, 1333MHz, 80W) 
Intel® Xeon® processor L5420 (2.50 GHz, 1333MHz, 50W) 
Intel® Xeon® processor E5410 (2.33 GHz, 1333MHz, 80W) 
Intel® Xeon® processor L5410 (2.33 GHz, 1333MHz, 50W) 
Intel® Xeon® processor E5405 (2.00 GHz, 1333MHz, 80W) 
Intel® Xeon® processor X5365 (3.00 GHz, 1333MHz, 
120W) 
Intel® Xeon® processor X5355 (2.66 GHz, 1333MHz, 
120W) 
Intel® Xeon® processor E5345 (2.33 GHz, 1333MHz, 80W) 
Intel® Xeon® processor L5335 (2.00 GHz, 1333MHz, 50W)  
Intel® Xeon® processor E5335 (2.00 GHz, 1333MHz, 80W) 
Intel® Xeon® processor E5320 (1.86 GHz, 1066MHz, 80W) 
Intel® Xeon® processor L5320 (1.86 GHz, 1066MHz, 50W)  
Intel® Xeon® processor E5310 (1.60 GHz, 1066MHz, 80W) 
 
Dual-Core Processors 
Intel® Xeon® processor X5270 (3.50 GHz, 1333MHz, 80W) 
35 
 
Intel® Xeon® processor X5260 (3.33 GHz, 1333MHz, 80W) 
Intel® Xeon® processor L5240 (3.00 GHz, 1333MHz, 40W) 
Intel® Xeon® processor E5205 (1.86 GHz, 1066MHz, 65W) 
Processor Cores Dual and Quad 
Cache memory Up to 12MB L2 cache (2 x 6MB) 
Sockets 2 
Max front side bus 1333MHz 
Memory Type PC2-5300 DDR2 FB DIMMs 
Standard memory 2GB 
(2GB base models; 4GB performance models) 
Max Memory 64GB 
Memory protection Advanced ECC; Mirrored Memory; Online Spare 
Storage 
Storage type Hot plug 2.5-inch SAS 
Hot plug 2.5-inch SATA 
Max Drive Bays Up to 8: SFF Hot plug to support Serial-attached SCSI (SAS) 
and Serial ATA (SATA) drives 
Storage controller Performance Models: HP Smart Array P400/512MB BBWC 
Controller (RAID 0/1/1+0/5/6) 
High Efficiency and Base Models: HP Smart Array 
P400/256MB Controller (RAID 0/1/1+0/5) 
Entry Models: HP Smart Array E200/64MB Controller 
(RAID 0/1/1+0) 
Expansion Slots 4 total slots 
Deployment 
Form factor Rack 
 
 
 
 
Rack height 2U 
Networking Two (2) Embedded NC373i Multifunction Gigabit Network 
Adapters with TCP/IP Offload Engine 
Remote 
management 
Integrated Lights-Out 2 
Power supply type Standard on performance models, optional on entry and base 
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models 
System fans Hot plug fully redundant 
Warranty - year(s) 
(parts/labor/onsite) 
3/3/3 
Table 3: HP ProLiant DL380 G5 Server series – specifications and warranty (HP, 2009) 
 
 As previously stated, the system required a fair amount of disk space and built-in 
reliability.  The operating system disk was mirrored, utilizing a RAID 1 configuration.  The data 
was striped across multiple disks, utilizing a RAID 5 configuration for redundancy.  Figure 10 
provides a pictorial representation of the disk layout and partition requirements. 
 
 
Figure 6: Disk Layout and Partitions (Rodriguez, 2009) 
Software Configuration 
 Sguil (pronounced sgweel) was developed by network security analysts for network 
security analysts (Visscher, 2007).  Sguil is a suite of modular applications that utilizes some of 
the best open source software available to comprise a network collection and monitoring security 
system.  It is agile enough to incorporate new and better applications as they are developed and 
can be deployed on a number of different hardware and software platforms.  Sguil provides the 
37 
 
functionality of an IDS, along with a myriad of data collection, and real-time monitoring tools.  
The Squil database allows for simple to complex SQL queries that can be completed in the 
shortest amount of time.   All these tools and abilities are consolidated within the Squil GUI, 
which is the command center of the Honeypot system.   In addition, Sguil provides an 
environment to develop, test, and analyze security tools and methodologies.  
 Both the Sun and Red Hat Sguil installs used the Sguil on RedHat HOWTO as an 
installation guide (Bianco, 2008).  Though this particular website focuses on Red Hat, the 
processes and software components needed to install and configure Sguil are the same, 
regardless of the platform OS.  The basic install steps were: 
 Identify the needed software package/s. 
 Download the source code 
 Compile and install the software package/s 
 Test and verify install 
A list of the needed software components for Sguil can be found below: 
Software  Version Location Download Location  Notes  
MySQL  5.x  Server  http://dev.mysql.com/downloads/mysql  4.1.x versions also work  
Libpcap  0.9.7  Sensor  http://www.tcpdump.org/  
Libnet  1.0.2a  Sensor  http://www.packetfactory.net/libnet/  
Neither newer 
nor older 
versions may 
be used.  
Snort  
2.6.1.5 
(or 
newer)  
Sensor  http://www.snort.org/dl/  
You will also 
need to 
register for a 
free snort.org 
account in 
order to 
download 
IDS rules  
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SANCP  1.6.1d  Sensor  http://www.metre.net/sancp.html  
1.6.2 versions 
don't seem to 
work 
correctly for 
Sguil yet, but 
the developer 
is working on 
this.  
Barnyard  0.2.0  Sensor  http://www.snort.org/dl/barnyard/  
PADS  1.2  Sensor  http://demo.sguil.net/downloads/pads-1.2-sguil-mods.tar.gz  
You must use 
the version 
with the built-
in Sguil 
modifications. 
The standard 
PADS 
version will 
not work.  
P0f  2.0.8  Server  http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/p0f.shtml  
Tcpflow  0.21  Server  http://www.circlemud.org/~jelson/software/tcpflow/ 
Tcltls  1.5.0  Server, Client  http://tls.sourceforge.net/  
Provides for 
an encrypted 
data channel 
between the 
sguil server 
and the 
analyst 
consoles or 
sensors  
Mysqltcl  3.03  Server  http://www.xdobry.de/mysqltcl/  
Tcllib  1.9  Server  http://tcllib.sourceforge.net/  
Sguil  0.7.0  
Server, 
Sensor, 
Client  
http://www.sguil.net/  
Note: 0.7.0 is 
currently in 
test release, 
so you'll need 
to fetch the 
CVS version. 
Sguil 
startup 
scripts  
0.7.0  Server, Sensor  http://instantnsm.sourceforge.net/  
I've put 
together a set 
of 
prepackaged 
startup scripts 
for the 
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various 
components. 
These files 
come with the 
InstantNSM 
distribution.  
Table 4: Sguil Software Components (Bianco, 2008) 
Due to Sun’s prevalence, many of the required software components were found online, 
pre-compiled and ready for install (Christensen, 2009).  Though, the Solaris 10 install of Sguil 
also required many software prerequisites that are not listed in Table 4.  For example, TclX is a 
base component needed for Sguil and not part of the Solaris 10 full install.  In the end it was a 
TCL version mismatch that forced the move to another OS.  Since, TCL/ TclX are Sguil 
foundation modules, it became evident that the TCL mismatch might force a recompile/ reinstall 
of all the Sguil components.  In addition, there were packages that would not compile on Solaris 
10, the PADS application being one example (Meissner, 2008).  Due to the unknown variables, 
lack of support from Sun/ Solaris community, and project time constraints (4 months were 
exhausted on the attempted Solaris Sguil install), Solaris 10 was abandoned (See Appendix A: 
Project Communications). 
There are a slew of resources documenting the success of running Sguil on the Red Hat 
operating system.  The benefit of being the more established Linux variant, clearly had a positive 
effect on the support available via news, forums, and user groups.   Furthermore, the RPM 
package install utility was found to be much easier to navigate than Sun’s “package add” utility 
for loading the additional software on the system.  The Sguil software modules compiled and 
installed with much less user intervention (e.g., modifications to config/ make files) than on the 
comparable Solaris installation.  As observed during this project, the hardware, software, and 
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application configurations were found to be more effective and time efficient using the Red Hat 
Operating System.   
Chapter Four: Wrapping it Up 
Results 
 
This document studied the most adaptable Unix-like operating system for use as a 
combined Honeypot sensor server.   From the plethora of operating systems considered, both Sun 
Solaris and Redhat Linux were selected for the study.  In the end, Redhat Linux was better suited 
to accomplish the task of running a combined Honeypot sensor server.  Previously in this paper, 
the evaluated OS criterion was represented pictorially (reference Figure 5:  Combined Honeypot 
Sensor Server OS Criterion).   Table 5 provides a more detailed examination of the OS 
comparison results.   
  
  Operating  Systems   
  
Sun 
Solaris 
Redhat 
Linux 
    E
valuated  C
haracteristics 
Ease of Install   X 
Extensibility X   
Reliability X  
Performance   X 
OS Support   X 
Application Sustainment   X 
Database Support X   
Security X   
Software Compatibility   X 
Hardware Flexibility   X 
Market Prevalence   X 
Requirement for Additional Training X   
Table 5: Extensive OS Decision Matrix (Rodriguez, 2009) 
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Like Figure 5, the Extensive OS Decision Matrix (Table 5), illustrates the superior 
attributes of Redhat Linux over Sun Solaris.  Table 5, was developed based on the need for a 
conclusive determination of OS characteristics, regardless of how slight the advantage of one OS 
over the other.  In some cases the conclusion was based on real-world experience, survey, and 
perspective; not necessarily extensive empirical study.   The reason for this is based on the fact 
that some characteristics are entirely relative to experience (e.g., ease of install).  The following 
will review the main points that gave the prevailing OS the edge over the other and provide 
justification for the conclusion. 
Ease of install is important to the Honeypot, due to the fact that Honeypot systems are 
designed to be attacked, compromised, and rebuilt.   Though both OS were similarly easy to 
install, Redhat provided a slightly more user friendly interface based on its more Windows like 
interface.  Again, both install interfaces were straight-forward, but from the perspective of a 
novice user, Redhat had a very slight edge.  
Extensibility is important to the flexibility of the Honeypot project, since it will provide the 
foundation of where/ and what the Honeypot software can be installed.  Development is directly 
related to overall platforms fielded.  With Oracles commitment to maintain Suns hardware 
development/ deployment strategy, Sun has the opportunity to maintain its overall lead in CPU 
types that will support Sun Solaris (Finkle, 2009). 
Reliability corresponds to the Honeypot ‘s availability or the uptime of the enviornment.  The 
Honeypot’s effectiveness will be serverly disabled, if the system is not deemed reliable.   Solaris 
has a slight edge by the means of having the more mature operating system and experience in the 
enterprise with clustering, security, and less agile software releases.  Although agile software 
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development is a benefit within some applications, the Honeypost system would benefit from 
Suns more structured model of delivery. 
Performance the speed and efficiency in which Honeypot system can do its job, measured in 
terms of hardware resource use: CPU, memory, and I/O.   Though this study did not complete a 
side by side performance comparison, based on industry research, Linux has clearly dominated 
the HPC (High Performance Computing) market in recent years (Meuer, Strohmaier, Dongarra, 
& Simon, 2009). 
The supportablity of the OS is directly related to the longevity of the project.  Technically, 
the project needs the best possible support model for its continued existence.  Based on 
experience gained from this study, Linux is superior in this category, especially since the 
majority of Honeypot software was initally developed with the Linux operating system in mind. 
Sustainment is the logistics to maintain the project from a personnel and economic 
perspective, differing from the technical aspects of supportability.  Linux continues to lead in 
overall deployments and its growth looks to dwarf future deployments of Sun’s current operating 
system model.  This continues to lead to an increase in the number of people who know and can 
sustain Linux.  Linux administrators will be more easily to find and train, than their Sun 
counterparts. 
The Honeypot system is highly reliant on the collection of large amounts of data.  Due to the 
necessity for the large collection of data, database integrity is crucial to the system.  With 
Oracle’s acquisition of Sun and wtih Sun acquiring, Sun seems poised to benefit from these 
newfound database partnerships (Finkle, 2009).   Sun has a decisive database advantage over its 
competitors. 
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Confidentiality, integrity, and availability is core to the security of an operating system (Dulaney, 
2009).  Sun has a long tradition of providing a secure operating system environment.  At least for 
the short-term, Sun maintains a slight security advantage over Linux, based on experience and 
overall OS maturity. 
All things considered, it boils down to whether all the software components that compose the 
Honeypot system will work together.  The myriad of software applications/ components that 
compose the Honeypot softwares suite were quite easily and successfully installed on Redhat.  
After numerous attempts, many of components, specific versions,  would not compile on the Sun 
platform. 
Hardware flexibility underlies the ability to opeate the Honeypot system on a wide range of 
hardware platforms.   While Sun might have an advantage in extensibility or the variance of 
CPUs that support Solaris, Redhat is openly supported by more Vendors.  Redhat can be 
installed on just about any off-the-shelf computer.  Redhat has a tremendous advantage over 
Solaris in the realm of hardware flexibility. 
Market prevalence is a consideration, as the investment in the Honeypot system is 
significant.  As previously stated, time, money, and other resources are required to maintain a 
system and the system should be designed with a healthy lifecycle at the forefront.  Sun’s once 
strong foothold in the government/ DOD sphere that once gave them an advantage has eroded as 
Redhat is now authorized in the U.S. government computing space (Beekman & Abhyankar, 
2005).  Redhat has continued to grow in number of commercial installs, as well (Kerner, 2009).  
Redhat continues to extend into many markets the use to be reserved for the big Unix giants 
(Sun, IBM, SGI, etc.). 
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Training requirements for any new system can delay it successful deployment, as teams are 
trained to maintain the system.  Training and support through the Solaris community was once a 
model for others to follow.   Many of the those forums (e.g., Sun BigAdmin, SEtookit, 
docs.sun.com, etc.) are now retired and all learning locked down to the paying community.  As 
well, with the latest versions of Solaris, Sun has taken a strategy of foraging a new direction, 
separate from traditional Unix and Linux distributions.  This strategy unfortunately requires 
specialized skills that results in a smaller pool of engineers, developers, and system 
administrators that are able to support the systems.  A few examples: 
o NFS file names are different (e.g.,  /etc/dfs/dfstab versus the traditional /etc/exports) 
o Startup/ RC (run control) scripts are different (e.g., /etc/init.d has been antiquated in 
Solaris) 
o Services management is different (svcs/ svcamdin versus /etc/config files) 
o Network services (e.g., /etc/inetd.conf has been antiquated in Solaris) 
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Summary 
From the results of this study, Redhat was the better product for this project.  Clearly the 
benefits of having a massive pool of software contributors/ developers have given the open 
source OS community and edge over the traditional OS manufactures.  Specific evidence is 
documented in appendicies, showing multiple Honeypot component application developers 
conceded that their applications were not being actively tested or developed for current Solaris’ 
releases. The concessions from the legacy OS vendors (like Sun) to the open source movement 
are evident in the fact that every major OS manufacture has jumped onto the open source 
bandwagon either by commitment or action.  Visit Sun’s open source project at 
http://opensolaris.org.    
Recommendations 
Recommendations for this project include: 
 The primary use of Redhat or similar Linux distribution for a combined Honeypot 
sensor server 
 The continued testing of new OS releases as they become available, to verify the 
system is current to the market 
 The leveraging of virtual computing and its many advantages (i.e., hardware 
footprint, savings in HVAC, recovery time, system rebuild/ recovery time, etc.) 
 Membership in one of the many international or national Honeypot groups/ 
alliances to further the organization’s experience, knowledge, and contribution to 
ongoing security computing and networking efforts 
 An active Honeypot lab, committed to collecting ongoing real-time data and 
developing counter-measures/ solutions to real world threats and vulnerabilities 
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 Separation of the Honeypot Server and Sensor to distinct/ individual computing 
environments (virtual or physical) 
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